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In the previous paper I resituated Peter Singer's Animal Liberation within the larger 
context of the historical development of the animal activist movement. This paper 
directly follows on from the previous one, but here I take a closer at the book itself, 
focusing on 'Tools for Research', the second chapter in which Singer discusses animal 
experimentation particularly. My aim is to draw attention to the tactics adopted by 
Singer, which given the historical development of the movement, as detailed 
previously, are indeed activist, and offer some account of why they are morally 
persuasive.  
 
 
The Activists, their Strategies, and their Critics 
In the previous paper, we got a good sense of the activist strategy adopted by Hageby 
and Schartau. Theirs was the strategy of infiltrating the experimental space, in this 
instance as students, and describing to the public in some detail what they saw there, 
both in terms of the practical actions of all who participated and their collective 
attitude.  An example of this strategy of infiltrating a research laboratory is also 
briefly described in ‘Tools for Research’ although the exposé in question took the 
form of video footage rather than a written account.  The content of both however is 
surprisingly similar.   
 
In the second edition to Animal Liberation Singer describes a particular case in which 
activists belonging to the Animal Liberation Front infiltrate the laboratory of Dr. 
Thomas Gennarelli at the University of Pennsylvania and steal a number of video 
recordings showing various experiments conducted on baboons. Singer tells us that 
the aim of the experiments was to inflict head injuries on otherwise healthy baboons 
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in order to study the nature of the damage to their brains.  The apes were supposed to 
be anaesthetised at the time but Singer writes:  
When they viewed [the tapes], they saw conscious, unanesthetized baboons 
struggling as they were being strapped down before the head injuries were 
inflicted. They saw animals writhing, apparently coming out of anesthesia, 
as surgeons were operating on their exposed brains. (Singer, 1995: 81) 
What is similar to the Hageby-Schartau case is that the participants, all of whom were 
researchers involved in the study including Gennarelli himself, could be seen and 
heard laughing and mocking the animals during the experiments. Here again 
collective behaviour more akin to entertainment than medical research could be seen; 
here again, a spirit of jocularity seemed to prevail.  Singer writes that eventually, after 
the public airing of the tapes and much lobbying by various people including 
members of PETA, funding for the research was withdrawn by the secretary of health 
and humans services, although no-one was formally charged with cruelty to animals 
(Singer, 1995: 81).  
 
The researchers, from the public point of view, had overstepped some mark. It was 
not solely that the animals were seen to be suffering horribly; critical to public outrage 
was their attending to the situation in such a way as to view it with dismay or disgust, 
or indignation (anything but delight). This was something the researchers had not 
done. Rather, they had ridiculed and made fun of the animals who in no way could 
have responded or defended themselves. The apes were not simply restrained by 
actual straps and cords and made objects of experimental research, they were made 
the victims of unsavoury jokes and taunts by people in particular positions of power 
whose ordinary sensibility failed them, which, in having the situation exposed, the 
public brought to bear on the case. It was this mark, as much as any other, that the 
researchers, from the public point of view, had overstepped; as was similarly the case 
in the situation described by Hageby and Schartau. I flag this idea of bringing to bear 
a common-sensibility as one that will be more fully developed a little later.  
 
 
Cobbe’s ‘Light in Dark Places’  
Written in 1883, Light in Dark Places offers an insight into the routine beliefs and 
practices of the social world of the vivisector. Cobbe’s general focus at the time was 
on the science of physiology and so the content of her pamphlet reflects this 
commitment. Her declared aim was to clarify for the public what the word 
‘vivisection’ actually meant in practice, but the motivation for the pamphlet was 
certainly to convince readers to reject the practice. As a member of the Victoria Street 
Society at the time, only ‘the total suppression of vivisection’ was an acceptable 
outcome for Cobbe.  
 
  
The pamphlet contains various descriptions and illustrations of the equipment used by 
physiologists at the time, including tools and tables and specialised ‘ovens’, all of 
which were taken from the vivisector’s own publications or ‘letter-press descriptions’. 
Every illustration, Cobbe assured her readers, ‘may be taken with certainty to be a 
Vivisector’s own picture of his own work, such as he himself has chosen to publish it’ 
(Cobbe, 2004 (1883): 293, her emphasis). The same can be said of the experiments 
she describes for all are taken from the vivisector’s own reports, and in most cases 
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reprinted in their own words. Apart from one or two, all the experiments included in 
the pamphlet, she says, were routinely performed, so much so, that they represented 
the expected level of competency for any physiologist worthy of the title. She writes: 
‘[the experiments] are gone over by each new recruit in the army of science who takes 
up the study of the organs concerned, and may be likened more properly to the scales 
and exercises of the musical practitioner, than to the purposeful operations of the 
surgeon’ (Cobbe, 2004 (1883): 294).  
 
At the outset readers prepared to take comfort in the view that the animals were 
rendered ‘insensible to pain’ in these experiments are confronted with some 
experimenters’ own concerns regarding the use and effectiveness of anaesthesia. 
Citing, for example, Claude Bernard’s work, Cobbe informs readers that ‘morphia’, 
the most important of anaesthetics at the time, may plunge dogs into a state of 
immobility but it does not render them insensible, for ‘if we pinch the animal’, says 
Bernard, ‘he moves and cries’ (Cobbe, 2004 (1883): 296).  
 
From here Cobbe introduces readers to illustrations of the various tools used by 
vivisectors, most of which were reproduced from Bernard’s Physiologie Opératoire 
(1879). There are illustrations of knives, saws, scissors, hooks, screws, pincers, 
scalpels which are quickly followed by illustrations and descriptions – generally taken 
from the same source – of vivisector’s tables and other restraining devices. Readers 
are invited to view an instrument for producing artificial respiration, several tables of 
various sizes and design and the methods by which animals are restrained (that is, by 
providing illustrations of restrained animals), a suspension device used to hold 
animals upright during the experiment and a jaw clamp, a machine for measuring the 
rate of the blood-current in the arteries or rabbits, and Bernard’s famous stoves in 
which he placed otherwise healthy animals and increased the temperature until the 
animals died of heat exhaustion. According to Bernard’s results says Cobbe, dogs, 
pigeons and rabbits expired at temperatures of 90 or 100 degrees centigrade in 6 
minutes, 10 minutes and 24 minutes and at higher temperatures at different intervals 
(Cobbe, 2004 (1883): 298-310).  
 
In conjunction with illustrations of this latter experiment, are Bernard’s own 
descriptions of what went on. Here Cobbe cites Bernard directly:  
The animals exhibit a series of symptoms always the same and 
characteristic. At first the creature is a little agitated. Soon the respiration 
and circulation are quickened. The animal opens its mouth and breathes 
hard. Soon it becomes impossible to count its pantings; at last it falls into 
convulsions, and dies in uttering a cry. (Cobbe, 2004 (1883): 310)  
Citing further material from Bernard’s work, Cobbe draws readers’ attention to the 
fact that these experiments were part of a series of lectures given to students; they 
represented routine experimental procedures and conventional teaching material for 
training future members of the profession.  
 
Bernard’s experiments were not the only ones to be cited by Cobbe. She also took 
examples from the work of French physiologist Elie de Cyon (cited earlier), from his 
Methodik der physiologischen experimente und vivisectionen (1876). Regarding an 
experiment on the head of a rabbit, de Cyon writes: 
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The rabbit is firmly fastened to the ordinary vivisecting table by means of 
Czermak’s holder …now holding the head of the animal very firmly, the 
blade of the knife is directed backwards and downwards and pressed hard in 
this direction against the base of the skull. The nerve is then generally cut 
behind the Gasserian ganglion, which is announced by a violent cry of 
agony of the animal. (cited by Cobbe, 2004 (1883): 317)  
Readers again get a very clear sense of the didactic nature of this description, of the 
aim of the vivisector to not only report on the results, but to teach those desiring to 
become physiologists at that time and place in history.  Interestingly, Cobbe cites a 
long passage of de Cyon’s in which he gives an apparently ‘well-known’ description 
of the ‘true’ vivisector. The passage is worth citing in full, both to appreciate the 
artistry of the description itself with its clear sexual overtones, and also to appreciate 
the sense in which one of physiology’s leading exponents likened the practice to any 
other art form; likened the vivisector to any other artist, to people with particularly 
imaginative sensibilities, which when placed side by side with the illustrations and 
descriptions of the suffering endured by the animals and taken outside of its usual 
readership – that is, by fellow vivisectors or students in the field – might serve to 
persuade otherwise, hence its inclusion in Light in Dark Places.  
 
Citing de Cyon Cobbe writes:  
The true vivisector must approach a difficult vivisection with the same 
joyful excitement, and the same delight, wherewith a surgeon undertakes a 
difficult operation, from which he expects extraordinary consequences. He 
who shrinks from cutting into a living animal, he who approaches a 
vivisection as a disagreeable necessity, may very likely be able to repeat one 
or two vivisections, but will never become an artist in vivisection. He who 
cannot follow some fine nerve-thread, scarcely visible to the naked eye, into 
the depths, if possible sometimes tracing it to a new branching–with joyful 
alertness for hours at a time; he who feels no enjoyment when at last, parted 
from its surroundings and isolated, he can subject that nerve to electrical 
stimulation; or when, in some deep cavity, guided only by the sense of touch 
of his finger-ends, he ligatures and divides an invisible vessel; to such a one 
there is wanting that which is most necessary for a successful vivisector. 
The pleasure of triumphing over difficulties held hitherto insuperable is 
always one of the highest delights of the vivisector. And the sensation of the 
physiologist, when from a gruesome wound, full of blood and mangled 
tissue, he draws forth some delicate nerve-branch, and calls back to life a 
function which was already extinguished–this sensation has much in 
common with that which inspires sculptor, when shapes forth fair living 
forms from a shapeless mass of marble. (Cobbe, 2004 (1883): 305-7, my 
emphasis) 
The passage itself was taken from the preface to de Cyon’s work on physiological 
methods cited above.  Animals in this context, like the canvas of the painter or the 
wood of the carpenter, are the materials by which the vivisector-artist creates. Put 
along side the illustrations of tools and tables, they are much like the tools themselves, 
for nowhere does de Cyon mention the animal to which he is referring – it could be 
any animal, anywhere, anytime. Furthermore, nowhere in this passage do we get a 
sense that this is something we should not being doing to an animal, rather we should 
be doing it and taking delight in what we are doing. This is what apprentices in the 
field should be aiming to achieve, this is how the superior vivisector works – and it is 
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this ‘how to go on’, ‘how to do it’ that we become privy to as outsiders of the 
discipline.   
 
I have offered a sampling of the various experiments and illustrations contained in 
Cobbe’s pamphlet. There is little theoretical discussion or philosophical argument 
contained in the work. Something about the descriptions and illustrations, Cobbe 
believed, would stand on their own as testament to the necessary cessation of 
vivisection as a scientific practice. To her mind, readers attending to the practice as it 
was performed by physiologists who could be named and their actual experiments 
described was a valuable strategy in making vivisection a matter of common concern. 
Peter Singer adopts a similar strategy in ‘Tools for Research’ that the following 
summary will show.  
 
 
Singer’s ‘Tools for Research’ 
Scattered throughout Singer’s chapter are summaries of actual experiments conducted 
on animals by real scientists whom Singer indeed names. And like Cobbe, in 
summarising the various experiments Singer often cites the practitioner’s own 
scientific account of what went on. Unlike Cobbe’s focus on physiology, many of the 
experiments Singer attends to are those from the field of psychology. I will outline 
some of these examples and Singer’s associated commentary but certainly not all for 
his citations are extensive and for the purpose of identifying his strategy citing all of 
them is unnecessary.  
 
Part way into the chapter Singer describes a series of experiments conducted by Dr 
Harry Harlow and others studying social isolation in particularly infant monkeys, 
presumably, although it is not stated by Singer, to act as models for understanding and 
human psychopathology of the same order. Singer (1976: 43) begins citing from one 
of the researchers’ own publications: 
For the past ten years we have studied the effects of partial social isolation 
by raising monkeys from birth onwards in bare wire cages…These monkeys 
suffer total maternal deprivation…More recently we have initiated a series 
of studies on the effects of total social isolation by rearing monkeys from a 
few hours after birth until 3, 6 or 12 months of age in [a] stainless steel 
chamber. During the prescribed sentence in this apparatus the monkey has 
no contact with any animal, human or sub-human. 
In a series of subsequent experiments, Singer tells us, the researchers designed 
surrogate ‘monster mothers’ (their phrase) in order to induce depression in baby 
monkeys. The researchers write in another publication:  
The first of these monsters was a cloth monkey mother who, upon schedule 
or demand, would eject high-pressure compressed air. It would blow the 
animals skin practically off its body. What did the baby monkey do? It 
simply clung tighter and tighter to the mother, because a frightened infant 
clings to its mother at all costs. We did not achieve any psychopathology. 
(cited by Singer, 1976: 44) 
 
  
The researchers go on to describe various other types of monster mothers that failed to 
produce the required psychopathology in the infants, eventually giving up on artificial 
mothers, finding they could produce real live ones as Singer  (1976: 44-45) describes:  
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To produce such mothers, they reared female monkeys in isolation, and then 
tried to make them pregnant. Unfortunately the females did not have normal 
sexual relations with male monkeys, so they had to be made pregnant by a 
technique that Harlow and Suomi refer to as “a rape rack”. When the babies 
were born the researchers observed the monkeys. They found that some 
simply ignored the infants, failing to cuddle the crying baby to the breast as 
normal monkeys do when they hear their baby cry.  
Through a further extract of the researchers’ own work, readers discover that other 
‘monster mothers’ were more brutal in their rejection of their babies, sometimes 
crushing the skull of the infants with their teeth or by smashing the infant’s face into 
the floor and rubbing it back and forth (Singer, 1976: 45).  
 
Regarding the results of particularly the artificial monster mother experiments, Singer 
notes that the researchers themselves remarked that is was not surprising to them that 
the babies kept returning to the monster mother, since ‘the only recourse of an injured 
child is to cling to its mother’ (Singer, 1976: 44).  In terms of Singer’s own 
commentary, he suggests that despite the great pain caused the many animals he had 
described no momentous or vital new knowledge had been generated. Animals have 
become, he says (1976: 46):  
for the psychologist and for other researchers, mere tools. A laboratory may 
consider the cost of these “tools”, but a certain callousness toward them 
becomes apparent, not only in the experiments performed but also in the 
wording of the reports.  
 
I offer one more example of an actual experiment that Singer describes, which also 
concerns the work of a psychologist. He provides readers with an insight into the 
work of Martin Seligman who performed a series of experiments designed to generate 
a state of ‘learned helplessness’ in dogs. The following extracts Singer takes from 
Seligman’s various publications and so constitute Seligman’s own descriptions:  
When a normal, naïve dog receives escape/avoidance training in a 
shuttlebox, the following behaviour typically occurs: at the onset of electric 
shock the dog runs frantically about, defecating, urinating and howling until 
it scrambles over the barrier and so escapes from shock. On the next trial the 
dog, running and howling, crosses the barrier more quickly, and so on, until 
efficient avoidance emerges (cited by Singer, 1976: 39) 
 
And in subsequent shuttlebox experiments after the dogs have been administered 
electric shocks in harnesses from which they have no means of escape, Singer tells 
readers, again citing Seligman’s own words that: 
[the] dog reacts initially to shock in the shuttlebox in the same manner as the 
naïve dog. However in dramatic contrast to the naïve dog it soon stops 
running and remains silent until shock terminates. The dog does not cross 
the barrier and escape from shock. Rather it seems to “give up” and 
passively “accept” the shock. On succeeding trials the dog continues to fail 
to make escape movements and thus takes 50 seconds of severe, pulsating 
shock on each trial….a dog previously exposed to inescapable shock…may 
take unlimited shock without escaping or avoiding at all. (cited by Singer, 
1987: 39).  
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In the second edition to Animal Liberation, Singer (1995: 47) informs readers that 
‘learned helplessness’ experiments continued into the 1980s with research switching 
to experiments on rats and fish. 
 
It is also in the second edition that Singer introduces the notion of ‘conditioned ethical 
blindness’, a concept he borrows from an ex animal experimenter who later became 
an active member in the liberation movement. Don Barnes says that during the many 
years of his involvement in experimenting on animals he was never confronted either 
formally or informally with the ethical issues concerning the use of animals, rather 
‘his entire life had consisted of being rewarded for using animals, treating them as 
sources of human improvement or amusement…’ (cited by Singer, 1995: 71). In 
Singer’s (1995: 71) words: ‘just as a rat can be conditioned to press a lever in return 
for a reward of food, so a human being can be conditioned by professional rewards to 
ignore the ethical issues raised by animal experiments’.  
 
He describes some of this conditioning. For example he states that detachment is often 
made easier through the use of technical jargon and hygienic-sounding terminology 
(Singer, 1995: 51); that the gradual “indoctrination” of students begins early with the 
dissection of, for example, frogs in biology classes in schools and that passing certain 
university courses often depends on students performing experiments on live animals 
(Singer, 1995: 70). Also, that when animal experimentation becomes the accepted 
mode of research in a particular research field the process is self-reinforcing in the 
sense that publications, promotions, awards and grants become geared towards that 
mode of research as does the public money, derived from taxation, which funds much 
of the research in the biological sciences (Singer, 1995: 72-74).  
 
Part of Singer’s rationale for including reports of actual experiments, he says (1976: 
36), is to ‘illustrate not sadism on the part of the individual experimenters [named] but 
the institutionalised mentality of speciesism that makes it possible for these 
experimenters to do these things without serious consideration of the interests of the 
animals they are using’. Singer would likely explain the purpose of Cobbe’s pamphlet 
in a similar way. The similar strategy adopted by both of reporting experiments 
outside their usual publication setting provides a valuable insight into the scientific 
communities’ routine beliefs and practices concerning the treatment of animals. 
Certainly, Cobbe and Singer adopt this strategy in order to problematise that which is 
taken for granted and regarded as morally unproblematic by members of the scientific 
social world experimenting on animals. Interestingly, the title of each work might 
equally apply to the other, for Cobbe implicitly suggests that animals are analogous to 
a vivisector’s tools, and Singer aims to expose the scientific social world of the 
experimenter and their collective ways concerning the treatment of animals which he 
regards, in many cases, to be callous and cruel.  
 
 
 
The Critics of these Strategies 
Writing in 1883, Elie de Cyon published a work criticising anti-vivisectionists and the 
strategies they employed to influence the general public. He does not single out 
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Cobbe’s pamphlet for criticism, but the judgments he makes might well apply to her 
work and indeed to Cobbe herself for he repeatedly refers to the ‘old maids’ of the 
movement in this article, of which he thought Cobbe to be one. Over a century later, 
Sharon M. Russell and Charles S. Nicoll, research physiologist and professor of 
physiology respectively, published two articles criticising Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation generally and his ‘Tools for Research’ chapter particularly, raising 
criticisms similar to those made by de Cyon against anti-vivisectionists one hundred 
or so years earlier. These criticisms include: the misrepresentation of scientific 
research through propagandist means; taking experiments out of context and not 
citing their rationale; the counterclaim of sentimentalism and irrationality on the part 
of the activists, and the bringing to bear on the scientific social world criticisms from 
people who are naïve outsiders to this world.  
 
In de Cyon’s The Anti-Viviesctionist Agitation (1883), he refers to the activists as 
‘unreasonable adversaries’, ‘fools’, ‘outsiders’, ‘hysterical sentimentalists’ and ‘old-
maids’ and in relation to the last he writes: 
Let my adversaries contradict me, if they can show among the leaders of the 
agitation one young girl, rich, beautiful, and beloved, or one young wife 
who has found in her home the full satisfaction of her affections! (de Cyon, 
2004 (1883): 232) 
The two examples of Louise Lind af Hageby and Leisa Schartau aside (who were 
young, and rich, and quite likely beautiful women), de Cyon’s commentary on young 
women and their dissatisfactions will not be pursued here. At the outset of his 
discussion he admonishes his colleagues for engaging with the activists, and that this 
was their crucial mistake. The scientists he says have not shown ‘an excessive 
condescension’ which they should have, for if the public have been misled  
the fault must rest first of all with the physiologists themselves, who, in 
deigning to enter the arena at all with such adversaries, gave them unmerited 
credit with the crowd. (de Cyon, 2004 (1883): 225)  
Also, in committing themselves to such debate, the scientists are forced to address 
their ‘refutations of the foolish accusations brought against them’ to the general 
public, to members of government and to members of parliament whose judgment as 
outsiders, he says, have ‘no value at all in matters of science’ (de Cyon, 2004 (1883): 
225).  
 
Concerning the physiologist’s own experimental work and the way in which activists 
have used it, de Cyon has this to say:  
…they mutilated the texts, distorted quotations, and held up to public 
animadversion the experiments described in memoirs intended for 
specialists, in which, very naturally, no mention was made of the 
anaesthetics to be used, their employment being taken as a matter of course. 
(de Cyon, 2004(1883): 225)  
Cobbe, as we saw, did mention anaesthetics in her pamphlet, but problematised their 
use according to the scientists’ own citations; de Cyon would likely argue that even 
these quotations were taken out of context. As an example, he takes issue with those 
whom he sees as having ‘distorted’ his description of the ‘true vivisector’, Cobbe in 
this instance being one of them. He rejects the suggestion that the pleasure which 
comes to a vivisector as he has described it in the passage can be interpreted as 
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pleasure derived from the suffering of the animal, and to conclude from this that the 
‘practice of vivisection develops cruelty’ in the vivisector. Rather, in reading the 
passage within the context in which it was intended, readers will see that an earlier 
part of the chapter set forth ‘the rules to be followed for sparing pain to the animals 
during vivisection’ (Cobbe 2004 (1883): 230). They include always using anaesthetics 
and avoiding the vivisection if the vivisector can ‘attain by other means the object in 
view’ (de Cyon, 2004 (1883): 230).  
 
Against accusations that vivisectors are cruel and callous people, de Cyon offers 
himself as an example: that as a passionate hunter and rider, he is a man with a strong 
attachment to horses and dogs, and so cannot be accused of a cruel disposition. 
Rather, he says, feelings of either cruelty or of compassion are not the motives by 
which a physiologists decide to perform vivisections (de Cyon, 2004 (1883): 231).  
 
The motives underlying scientists’ use of animals is an issue that Sharon M. Russell 
and Charles S. Nicoll likewise pick up on in their criticisms of Singer’s work. In their 
articles Animal Liberation: An Exchange (1992) and A Dissection of the Chapter 
“Tools for Research” in Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation (1996), Russell and Nicoll 
(1996: 110) accuse Singer of misrepresenting the truth about animal research, that 
‘objective but scientifically naïve readers’ of his chapter would probably come away 
thinking that while ‘giving animals the same moral consideration one normally 
extends to humans is not a rational concept, most or all of animal research must be 
cruel, painful, useless’. What Singer fails to offer his readers, they say, are the 
motives or rationale for the experiments. Russell and Nicoll (1996: 114) treat the 
Harry Harlow experiment as a case in point.  
…Singer does not “allow” Harlow to explain why he did the research in the 
first place. In the paragraphs preceding the quote, Harlow notes that social 
isolation in humans is “recognised as a problem of vast importance” and that 
“it is difficult or impossible to study scientifically the impacts of culturally 
produced social isolation at the human level”. Thus, his laboratory 
developed a monkey model for this condition in order to “find insights into 
the problems created by human social isolation from study of social 
isolation in monkeys”.  
 
Russell and Nicoll cite similar problems with Singer’s use of Seligman’s ‘learned 
helplessness’ experiments on dogs. Again, they say, he does not offer readers of 
‘Tools for Research’ reasons for the experiments and indeed misrepresents the nature 
of some of them. In terms of the latter, their claim is that in the reporting of one 
experiment, Singer fails to acknowledge that the ‘alleviation’ of learned helplessness 
was the issue in question rather than its inducement in naïve dogs and that the purpose 
of the study was to ‘investigate therapies for learned helplessness’. Russell and Nicoll 
also point to what they see as an irony concerning the case. Seligman himself had 
‘qualms about the ethics of animal research’ having done philosophy as an 
undergraduate major at university, yet overcame these qualms because of a conviction 
‘that only through well-controlled experiments using animals could causes and cures 
for emotional illnesses be found’ (Russell and Nicoll, 1996: 118). Readers of 
Seligman’s book, they claim, will learn a lot about how and why experimentation on 
animals is carried out in the discipline of psychology.  
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Russell and Nicoll proceed to challenge most of the examples of experiments Singer 
provides in ‘Tool for Research’ in the same way that they have done in the two 
examples cited. In their view, the chapter is ‘cleverly constructed to appeal to a target 
audience of impressionable animal lovers or the already true believers in the cult of 
animalism–giving them many examples of luridly portrayed research in the same 
tones one might use to describe an ogre under the stairs in a story designed to frighten 
children’ (Russell and Nicoll, 1996: 110). Beyond the criticisms they make of the 
specific examples of experiments, they claim that it is a chapter rife with anti-science, 
anti-intellectual, and anti-American sentiment. A scientist’s need to acquire 
knowledge, they say (1996: 136), ‘must not be encumbered by silly philosophies that 
are based on emotionalism and sentimentality (such as Singer’s), rather than on 
rationality and objectivity’.  
 
Singer offers a rebuttal to Russell and Nicoll’s of which I will say little other than that 
he rejects claims that he does not offer readers the rationales for the experiments and 
that his work does not employ emotional language, citing several reviewers who agree 
(for example, a reviewer from the NYRB describes Singer’s book as “unrhetorical 
and unemotional”). Regarding the language, he says, it is almost impossible not to 
arouse emotional responses when reporting on what happens to animals in 
experiments, that is why the language he chose to use was the language of the 
experimenters themselves precisely in order to avoid accusations of emotional 
overlay.   
 
 
Reflecting on the persuasiveness of Singer and Cobbe’s work 
There are a certain group of experiments that I now wish to return to, which Russell 
and Nicoll criticise Singer’s reporting on, that I will refer to here as the Gennarelli 
experiments or the Gennarelli case and which involve his research into head injuries 
in baboons. The Gennarelli case is useful because it brings out some of the underlying 
assumptions made by members on both sides of the general debate about 
experimenting on animals and exposes some of the problems with Singer’s 
arguments. 
 
Russell and Nicoll take particular issue with the 25 minute ‘exposé’ that PETA put 
together from the hours of footage that came into their possession and with Singer’s 
claims that the baboons were conscious during the experiments. According to Russell 
and Nicoll (1996: 130-31), no evidence exists to indicate that any of the animals 
shown on the film were suffering or were frightened when the experimenters were 
‘permitting themselves some unfortunate “gallows” humor’ (that is, laughing and 
mocking the animals during the experiments).  The real issue they say is that 
important research was halted that was very important to helping save human lives 
and to treating those affected by head injuries, which when combined with issues 
relating to rehabilitation was costing the U.S. government (at the time) over $25 
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billion annually (Russell and Nicoll, 1996: 131). I flag their criticism as something 
that I will return to shortly.  
 
As has been the case for all the experiments cited so far, and on both sides of the 
debate, the issue of sentience, understood as the capacity to suffer, has been central. In 
the Gennarelli case what Singer emphasised was the suffering of the baboons 
involved which Russell and Nicoll reject. They claim rather that that there was little 
or no suffering on the part of the baboons: the animals were ‘in fact heavily sedated 
and probably insensible’ (Russell and Nicoll, 1996: 130).  
 
If we come down on the side of Singer, that is, that the baboons were indeed 
conscious during the experiments and therefore suffered then there are grounds for 
claiming that the experimenters involved were guilty of wrongdoing. The researchers 
were guilty of speciesism because they did not give due consideration to the suffering 
of the animals involved in the experiment. If we come down on the side of Russell 
and Nicoll however, and make their claims stronger, that is, that the animals were 
rendered insensible then there is nothing morally problematic about this case 
according to Singer’s arguments.  The animals could not feel anything as they were 
rendered insensible and so the researchers could not be accused of speciesism. Their 
laughing and mocking of the baboons holds no weight in terms of Singer’s arguments 
because the animals did not suffer from the teasing of the experimenters; they were 
not aware of it. Without the issue of suffering involved on the part of the animals then 
it would seem that the critics could be right to insist that our responses are simply the 
responses of sentimentalists and that our judgements therefore have no bearing on this 
case.  
 
But to people who are not sadists (adopting Singer’s turn of phrase) there is very 
clearly something morally problematic about an experiment in which researchers 
laugh and mock the animals that they are in the process of deforming. The researchers 
may not be guilty of speciesism but there is something about their actions that is 
nevertheless important to consider in the debate over animal experimentation. Their 
behaviour represents a degree of callousness on their part that is not captured by 
Singer’s arguments and which is nevertheless important to consider. This is 
something that Singer himself recognises in ‘Tools for Research’ but loses sight of 
when he links what he calls conditioned ethical blindness to the institutionalised 
mentality of speciesism (Singer, 1995: 71).  
 
One way of responding might be something like this. Given, as Russell and Nicoll 
claim, the vital nature of the research where human lives and the wellbeing of human 
lives is at stake, why were the researchers laughing and joking and mocking the 
animals? How is this appropriate behaviour for people involved in, as Russell and 
Nicoll say, the very serious business of saving human lives? On this score, their 
behaviour was not simply ‘unfortunate’ it was unacceptable, appalling and shameful. 
It showed an attitude wholly inappropriate to the purpose of the research, which, 
ironically, is precisely what Russell and Nicoll accuse Singer of: of not taking human 
lives seriously enough.  
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The same argument might be made in relation to Francis Power Cobbe’s work. Like 
Singer, she takes sentience as the most important moral marker. In an article 
published in 1863, Cobbe writes that an animal’s capacity to suffer is cause sufficient 
why we should refrain from inflicting pain. We have a duty, she says, to avoid 
inflicting plain and to bestowing pleasure on creatures with the capacity to feel both. 
This is the bottom line principle to which we must subscribe; we need not get below it 
(Cobbe, 2004 (1863): 14). What is interesting here is that Cobbe’s argument does not 
really explain why de Cyon’s description of the vivisector is morally problematic if 
we take it that the animal(s) he is referring to in his description are rendered 
insensible and so therefore do not suffer. Cobbe is forced into the position of 
problematising the use of anaesthesia, which is precisely what she does, but this sort 
of discussion ends up focussing on technical/medical issues rather than focussing on 
the moral issues involved. Rather, what is at issue here, as it was in the Gennarelli 
case, is the exposing of a degree of callousness on the part of the experimenter that 
public readers are reacting to.  
 
The notion of sensitised people is a useful place from which to begin teasing out some 
of the issues brought to light by the above discussion. Researchers working in those 
scientific fields which take experimenting on animals as a central practice become 
sensitised to it. As we have seen in the discussion so far, and as Singer himself has 
pointed out, once researchers reach this point in their profession the work they 
produce is recognised and treated as credible by their fellow members in their 
respective disciplines: the practice of experimentation on animals is central to what 
these researchers do, they have learned how to approach the research situation. One of 
the interesting claims that could be made here is that the demand for objectivity 
essential to the development of science promotes moral detachment in scientists and it 
is perhaps this moral detachment that we are seeing in the descriptions and the 
researchers involved cited above. The question is how to develop this line of thought 
without falling into the same trap Singer and Cobbe fall into in making sentience (or 
some other capacity) the marker of moral significance.  
 
Cora Diamond associates moral detachment on the part of the experimenter with a 
‘compartmentalisation of mind’ where in which the experimenters, having become 
inured to the practice, can simply get on with the job (Diamond, 1995c: 355).  There 
is a lot more to her claim, and I will return to this shortly. At this point I want to say 
why I believe Singer and Cobbe’s works are persuasive, which has little to do with 
their moral arguments and much to do with their displacement of the experiments 
from the context in which they are traditionally embedded. In drawing this claim out I 
will return to Diamond’s ‘compartmentalisation of mind’ on the part of the researcher.  
 
What we as general readers bring to bear on the experiments is an ordinary, everyday 
sensibility towards animals that itself has been collectively produced, which is 
facilitated by the activists’ relocating the experiments outside their conventional 
publication space and conventional readership and so disrupts the expectations of how 
the experiments should be read. Whether experiments using animals yields morally 
and intellectually responsible knowledge, the practitioners would have us believe, 
depends in large part on the surety of the scientific community in which the 
  
 
Between the Species, IX, August 2009, http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
  
experiments are conducted and not outside it: how the community sees the 
experiments determines their acceptability and their worth. But the important point 
here is that the way in which the community sees the experiments and offers its 
assurance has itself been produced: scientists and researchers have been taught how to 
attend to the descriptions as part of their professional training, whereas the public 
have not been conditioned in the same way. And so when de Cyon, Russell and Nicoll 
talk of outsiders or naïve readers, they are talking of people who are strangers to a 
scientific practice and the way that these practices are to be seen that they, as trained 
practitioners, are not. The further inference that they make is that anyone not trained 
in the ways of that social setting, which includes how one attends to the descriptions, 
has little to say that is of value to those who have the collective authority to pass 
judgment. It is of little surprise then that those on the ‘inside’ equate the concept of 
naivety to those on the ‘outside’. What is interesting is that they further equate this 
idea of an uncomplicated or unconventional reading with an excessive and seemingly 
unwarranted expression of emotion.  How then might we deal with these claims and 
counter-claims of sentimentalism and callousness from those on both sides of the 
debate?  
 
I return now to Cora Diamond’s characterisation of the debate, which draws out the 
subtleties surrounding these very claims.   
 
Diamond characterises these two sides in terms of their differing views with regard to 
the use of animals in experimentation. View One (V1) says that ‘within limits, 
experimental animals may be regarded as delicate instruments, or as analogous to 
them, and are to be used efficiently and cared for properly, but no more than that is 
demanded.’ View Two (V2) on the other hand says that ‘within limits, animals may be 
regarded as sources of moral claims. These claims arise from their capacity for an 
independent life, or perhaps from their sentience, but in either case the moral position 
of animals is seen as having analogies with that of human beings’ (Diamond, 1995c: 
339). From the summary already provided, Singer’s work very clearly fits with V2, 
likewise Cobbe’s, for she too is concerned with sentience.  
 
de Cyon, Russell and Nicoll accept V1 concerning animal experimentation, which is 
borne out in their criticisms of Cobbe and Singer respectively. We saw earlier that de 
Cyon cited two ‘rules to be followed for sparing pain to the animal during vivisection’ 
(Cobbe 2004 (1883): 230) and so we can take pain relief to represent de Cyon’s 
minimal standard that experimenting on animals need meet in order to be justifiable. 
Russell and Nicoll are less explicit in what they regard as the minimal standards, but 
the issue of pain, and pain relief is certainly consistently raised throughout their 
discussion, so we may presume that like de Cyon, alleviating pain where it does not 
interfere with the aims of the experiment represent their minimal standards. Beyond 
these minimal standards, according to V1, there are no grounds for criticism from the 
moral point of view (Diamond, 1995c: 336). 
 
One of the important observations that Diamond makes at the outset of her paper and 
one that is consistent with the discussion so far is that the dispute between V1 and V2 
should not be seen as one between ‘those who attach greater and those who attach 
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lesser weight to the interests of animals in the clash between their interests and ours’ 
(Diamond, 1995c: 340). In other words, we need to move away from claims of 
‘speciesism’ in order to get to the heart of the debate. Rather, what is of interest is the 
idea of an area, that is the experimental setting, in which one ‘can simply get on with 
the job of asking and answering scientific questions, treating animals solely as our 
instruments in doing so’ (Diamond, 1995c: 341). And here again we should not 
simply equate this with Singer’s account in terms of the institutionalised mentality of 
speciesism. Diamond offers a well-chosen case study of her own to show how we 
might otherwise understand what is going on.  
 
In scientific expeditions where sled dogs are used, the dogs endure prolonged pain 
and suffering, and much discomfort. She says that while many people would think 
that should a situation arise in which the dog’s interests clashed with those of the 
humans involved then the dog’s would properly be sacrificed, they would also think 
that at the end of the journey the dogs should not be killed because of the costs 
involved in shipping them back (Diamond, 1995c: 340). The same cannot be said for 
dogs in experiments whose suffering might be greater and this difference in treatment 
is best explained with reference to modes of treatment associated with the 
experimental setting itself. Diamond writes:  
…in the experimental setting, the dog may come to be thought of merely as 
a useful and disposable object; we may come automatically to take it that 
there simply is no room for thinking of it as a being with a life of its own. 
We do not see it (for example) as a being to which something may be owed, 
in at least that minimal sense in which we may feel something–analogous, at 
least, to gratitude–is owed to the sled dog after what it has gone through. 
The animal seen in the laboratory setting becomes something we may 
respond to in accordance with quite a different set of ideas from those which 
are natural and quite common with the sled dog. (Diamond, 1995c: 340-1) 
What is interesting here, and which opens the way for an understanding of what she 
means by a compartmentalisation of the mind, is that holders of V1 may very well 
regard the sled dogs as sources of moral claims, but within the experimental setting of 
practical activity, and assuming that the minimal standards have been met, the dogs –
husky or otherwise – can be treated ‘as practicality dictates, and no moral concern, it 
is held, is appropriate’ (Diamond, 1995c: 341).  
 
de Cyon unwittingly offers an example of what is being spoken of here when he 
speaks of his fondness for dogs and horses. The image he offers is one of a man who 
takes a keen interest in these particular animals and who is very much concerned for 
their welfare and upkeep, but it is an interest that is context dependent, for in the very 
next sentence he says that he has ‘performed a great number of vivisections on dogs’ 
and ‘even operated on horses’ (de Cyon, 2004 (1883): 231). Of course, at an earlier 
point in the discussion he wrote of his commitment to minimising suffering in the 
experimental animals, but this further serves to exemplify Diamond’s point: assuming 
that the minimal standards have been met – and for de Cyon this is the alleviation of 
pain – no moral concern is held to be appropriate! 
 
Accusations of callousness against de Cyon and others who hold V1 should, says 
Diamond, be connected with the ‘idea that it leads to a harmful compartmentalization 
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of mental life, in which one does not bring to full imaginative realization what one is 
doing’ (Diamond, 1995c: 356). It is to cease taking in what one is doing to the dog, or 
horse, or monkey or rat as something which ‘one would oneself in other 
circumstances regard as deplorable, and which one therefore should, at the very least, 
notice, be concerned about, regret and regard as something one should try to avoid, 
and so on’ (Diamond, 1995c: 355). Otherwise humane people like de Cyon, set apart 
the experimental setting as one in which they ‘simply cannot bring in the sorts of 
consideration that play a role in judging how animals are treated outside that area’ 
(Diamond, 1995: 355). In this setting one quite naturally comes to apply a different 
standard of what counts as humane treatment that is distinct from other settings: one 
does not see the treatment of animals in this setting as raising any questions for it is 
part of the normal life of animals in the laboratory (Diamond, 1995c: 355).  
 
In my view Diamond’s account of what makes up the accusation of callousness better 
explains the persuasiveness of Singer’s chapter and Cobbe’s pamphlet than their 
respective arguments do, which both focus on sentience. What readers are bringing to 
their reading are the imaginative responses of those who (for the most part) do not 
share the compartmentalisation of mind of which Diamond speaks, and this in large 
part is due to the decontextualising of the descriptions that the activists employ as a 
tactic.  What they do is to invite readers to read ‘against the grain’ so to speak, to use 
the normal language of the scientists against itself, to invite readers to think “How 
horrific!”, “How horrible”, “That is no way to treat an animal”–for readers to bring to 
bear on the descriptions the kind of responses that humane people would bring in any 
other context when confronted with descriptions of, for example, baby monkeys 
deliberately isolated from their mothers and any wider social contact.  This is not to 
say that their tactics are persuasive for everyone, or that they are not in some way 
flawed. One of the obvious problems with the tactic is to elicit from readers the view 
that holders of V1 are cruel and callous people generally, that they are simply 
inhumane people. And further, that all experimentation on animals is unwarranted and 
that it ought be stopped immediately. The problem that holders of V1 say is the most 
significant however is that of eliciting sentimentalist responses from readers: views 
that are sentimentalist have no value in judgments regarding experimentation of 
animals. But what does this claim amount to? Diamond offers an answer.  
 
What is at the heart of their accusation, she says, is the claim that it is sentimental to 
take experimental animals’ lives seriously ‘when the serious business of our lives 
requires that we treat the area of experimentation as one in which such considerations 
are simply irrelevant’ (Diamond, 1995c: 359). What readers are doing in aligning 
themselves with V2, according to holders of V1, is to fail to ‘treat scientific 
investigation in an appropriate and realistic way’ and to fail to take into account its 
enormous significance for humanity (Diamond, 1995c: 359). On her reading then, 
what one side takes to be callous is precisely what the other side takes to be required 
by science in the name of humanity more generally:  
From the First View, the imaginative realization of what is done in 
experimentation to the individual animals is self-indulgent sentimentality; 
from the Second View, it is a form of callousness to set this area apart as 
one in which imaginative attention to what is done is out of place. 
(Diamond, 1995c: 359) 
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Importantly, this deep disagreement, she says, is a disagreement about ‘how people 
should live, about the place of science in life and the place of imagination in it, and 
the role…of getting on with the job’ (Diamond, 1995c: 360).  
 
We seem to have come full circle. We began implicitly with the question of how we 
should live with animals, examining Peter Singer’s answer of animal liberation along 
the way, and we have returned to it as that which is at the centre of the dispute over 
experimenting on animals. While we might align ourselves with the sentiment 
expressed by his answer, it is not simply through his arguments of equal consideration 
of interests that I believe we do so. ‘Tools for Research’ is persuasive because of the 
opportunity it provides readers who have not been sensitised in the way that scientific 
researchers have, to bring to bear on the descriptions an ordinary everyday sensibility 
that is indeed not unfamiliar to practitioners, but one that they have been conditioned 
to ignore. Decontextualising the descriptions also does something else, which 
challenges the place of science in the social order. 
 
There is a conception of scientific investigation that Diamond’s characterisation of the 
debate exposes, and which ‘Tools for Research’ in employing the tactic of 
decontextualising rejects. On this conception scientific investigation itself is 
understood as ‘a special sort of activity, whose special character is marked by…its 
immunity from some sorts of ordinary moral criticism’ (Diamond, 1995: 360). Using 
a spatial metaphor to explain this conception: it is treated as a sphere outside the 
ordinary where one can attend to reality with great scientific respect but nevertheless 
‘fail to take the things one is studying seriously except as things it is fascinating and 
rewarding, or frustrating, to study’ (Diamond, 1995c: 361). What Singer’s chapter 
does, if we read it without the overlay of speciesism, is to reject ‘the pretension of any 
activity to special moral status’ (Diamond, 1995c: 361). Decontextualising the 
descriptions amounts to stripping away this special status and re-grounding scientific 
investigation in the social order of the ordinary everyday. It is only on this basis that 
Russell and Nicoll’s (1996: 127) claims that Singer attempts to defrock scientists of 
their cloak of respect, and to discredit science generally make any sense. They are 
attempting to reclaim for scientific investigation immunity from the ordinary moral 
considerations that apply when seen as grounded in the ‘ordinary sphere’.  
 
‘Tools for Research’ as Cobbe’s ‘Light in Dark Places’ before it, asked readers and 
scientists alike to take seriously the lives of animals involved in experimentation. 
According to the authors, they did so on the grounds that the animals involved 
suffered and that we should take that suffering into account in our considerations. As I 
have argued here using both Kathryn Pyne Addelson’s notion of sensitised people and 
Cora Diamond’s work to develop the notion in much greater detail, there is another 
way of understanding the persuasiveness of Singer’s and Cobbe’s work, which moves 
away from justifications that focus solely on animal suffering towards those which 
take seriously the view that answers to questions of how we should live with animals 
are created in the process of living our everyday lives together. What Cobbe’s and 
Singer’s works do is to provide readers with an opportunity to respond to the 
treatment of animals within the experimental setting as they would ordinarily to such 
treatment outside that setting and for this reason their work is persuasive.  
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